Is based on the premise that people infer causes for their own and others behavior?

1.2 Social Categorization

Social categorization is the process through which we group individuals based upon social information. The “Big Three” are sex, race, and age, but numerous other dimensions are categorized as well, such as social status, occupation, and even perceptually ambiguous categories such as sexual orientation.33,34 Once determined, our social categorizations of others shape downstream evaluation and behavior, often without awareness.35,36 This can occur largely through stereotypic associations, which can result not only in harmful biases, such as a tendency to accidentally shoot individuals who belong to racial groups stereotyped to be hostile,37 but also ostensibly trivial biases, such as assumptions about the physical strength of young and elderly adults. Social categorizations also elicit evaluative biases and activate related attitudes (e.g., negative attitudes about Black individuals), which can exert strong impacts on behavior often in unintended ways.35 Somewhat surprisingly, the neural architecture supporting social categorization has been largely unexplored, in part because much interest in social categorization has focused on the outcomes following the categorization process (e.g.,38,39). Indeed, for over half a century, social categorization has been considered a precursor to stereotyping and prejudice.40 Recent models, however, propose that the reverse may also be true. As a social percept is processed in real time, stereotype and attitude structures may begin to spontaneously activate that in turn shape how that percept is even visually processed, molding it to conform to expectations derived from those stereotypes and attitudes.36 We explore such reciprocal social categorization processes in this chapter.

The features that give rise to social categorizations are often static, such as the shape of facial features, hair, and skin color. Accordingly, the social categorization of faces is undertaken primarily by the ventral-visual stream, including the OFA and FG/FFA.24 Corroborating this perspective, research has consistently found unique neural patterns for different races and sexes in these regions,41–43 and these patterns are highly sensitive to natural gradations in such social category cues.44 A large network of brain regions respond differentially to different visual social categories, but current knowledge indicates the regions in VTC play a central role in social category representation, consistent with their general role in visual categorization.45 Given the wide impact of social categorizations, stereotyping, and prejudice on evaluation and behavior, different social categories also elicit unique responses in a number of cortical and subcortical regions, such as those involved in conflict monitoring (anterior cingulate cortex), regulation (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), and evaluation (amygdala, OFC) (for reviews, see Refs 26,27). While these regions are highly responsive to different social categories, this chapter is concerned more with the visual representation of social categories and how social cognitive processes fundamentally mold that representation, rather than downstream evaluative or regulatory processes.

Social categorization is the process by which people categorize themselves and others into differentiated groups. Categorization simplifies perception and cognition related to the social world by detecting inherent similarity relationships or by imposing structure on it (or both). The main adaptive function of social categorization is that it permits and constrains otherwise chaotic inductive inferences. People attribute group features to individuals (stereotyping) and they—less strongly—generalize individual features to the group. The strength of these two kinds of inductive inferences depends ona priori assumptions about the homogeneity of the group. To the extent that social categories rest on detected patterns of feature similarity, their coherence is a matter of family resemblance. Family resemblance categories comprise members of varying typicality, they have fuzzy boundaries (and thus tend to overlap), and the features they contain tend to be correlated with one another. Some social categories are ‘thin,’ however, as their coherence rests solely on arbitrary or socially constructed labels. Both types of categories (family resemblance and social construction) give rise to two common, and socially problematic, biases: (a) ingroup favoritism and (b) perceptions of outgroup homogeneity.

3.2 Recategorization: The Common Ingroup Identity Model

The second social categorization model of intergroup contact and prejudice reduction is also based on the premise that reducing the salience of ingroup–outgroup category distinctions is key to positive effects. In contrast to the decategorization approach, however, recategorization is not designed to reduce or eliminate categorization. Instead, the goal is to create a superordinate category that encompasses both ingroup and outgroup in a single social group representation. This approach to the reduction of intergroup discrimination is known as the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993). It is based on the premise that when a superordinate category has been made salient, group members are more likely to think of themselves as one unit rather than two separate groups. When this form of recategorization is successful, ingroup loyalties are transferred from the original subgroups to the common social group as a whole.

The common ingroup identity model has been tested extensively in laboratory experiments assessing the conditions under which two previously segregated work groups can be successfully merged in a superordinate team. The experimental manipulations in these studies focus on situational variables that reduce the perceptual salience of ingroup–outgroup categorizations during the cooperative contact. Conditions that enhance the salience of the common team identity and reduce the salience of subgroup categories are found to diminish or eliminate ingroup–outgroup biases in the evaluation of fellow team members. To the extent that participants perceive the combined team as a single entity, rather than two separate groups, evaluations of former outgroup members become more positive.

25.4 Conclusions

Across all infant social categorization studies, the pervasive theme was that infants are categorizing people in their social world based on familiarity. They more expertly categorize women, high attractive females, low masculine males, and familiar race faces and exclude men, low attractive females, high masculine males, and unfamiliar race faces from these groups, respectively. These social categorization abilities typically do not emerge until 9 months of age or later with an exception being their ability to categorize female facial attractiveness as early as 6 months of age. Perhaps infants first categorize commonly experienced face types (i.e., familiar race female adults) based on prototypicality (attractiveness) before broadening their categorization to the wider social categories of gender and race and generalizing their categorization of prototypical females to low masculine males. More research is needed to understand the process by which these categorization abilities unfold and whether and how such abilities are related across social categories. This early emergence of social categories and expertise in processing certain categories over others, however, sets the stage for children to link affective and cognitive beliefs to these groups, and understanding when and how that occurs is an important future direction for the field.

Novel Contributions to the Second Edition

In presenting how social categorization and social knowledge contribute to the maintenance of self-concept, Amey and Forbes offer a fresh perspective bringing together observations from behavioral neuroscience and reconstructions of individual perceptions, showing how autobiographical memories are reconstructed and retrieved. They argue that it is the interplay between top-down categorization—social feedback that is semantically driven—and bottom-up processes that are data driven that help maintain and protect this self-concept, and how they influence what information is categorized as self-relevant.

It has long been assumed that emotions were discrete, categorically processed and subserved by qualitatively different neural substrates. In this new chapter on Emotion categorization, Hess addresses the question of the categorical or dimensional nature of emotions and shows how these two aspects have generally been conflated in research. The answer reveals a much more subtle and complex representation of emotions than usually held, one that shows that some of these processes are categorical and others dimensional.

Foroni and Rumiati write that food provides an apt case for models of categorization. Food is a salient and relevant biological category and the ability to classify foodstuff with nutritive value or fat content, for example, rests on dedicated neural correlates. Also, the preference for natural vs. transformed food is reflected in explicit vs. implicit tasks. The conclusion is that perception and categorization of food is strongly influenced by an individual’s internal states and immediate energy needs.

Sign languages have a class of predicates known as classifier predicates. In a chapter on Event categorization in sign languages, Zucchi studies these classifier predicates and shows that, from a semantic point of view, they correspond to demonstrative predicates of spoken languages.

In Syntactic Categorization in Sign Languages, Abner explores both the modality-independent and the modality-dependent properties of syntactic categorization in sign languages. She finds that the patterns attested in syntactic categorization in both sign languages and spoken languages overlap supporting the claim that “the properties of human language are not primarily driven by the modality of transmission but are only secondarily beholden to it.”

Ambridge analyzes how children acquire nouns and verbs. He evaluates three mechanisms of acquisition: innate, induced, or illusionary. He argues that the illusory approach is ultimately the one most likely to yield a successful explanation.

The chapter on how people categorize themselves and others on racial terms focuses on descriptive and predictive aspects of racial identity. In this new contribution, Nicolas and Skinner discuss some of the factors that shape how individuals categorize others and themselves by race, as well as some of the sociocognitive processes involved in racial classification, with a particular emphasis on issues of racial ambiguity. The literature reviewed here speaks to the malleability of racial judgments for both observers and targets that may have allowed for these changes in categorization. It appears that phenotypicality and ancestry, individual differences and developmental stage all play a role in our judgments of race. Racial categorization is thus an important precursor to a myriad of intra- and inter-group phenomena, from subtle behavioural biases to large-scale human rights violations.

A particularly interesting aspect of categorization at a very young age is the ability of infants to categorize faces—more specifically female, low masculinity, attractive faces. Rennels and Kayl review the predisposition of infants to develop categories following sufficient exposure to that category. The methodology is specific to research with infants and involves differential looking at stimuli. It appears that categorization abilities, such as matching face and voice typically emerge at about 9 months of age—although attractiveness is a feature that is responded to as early as 6 months of age. Infants may thus categorize familiar-race female adults based on prototypicality before broadening their categorization to the wider social categories of gender and race.

Categorization in the later ages is a research question raised by Mudar and Chiang. This is of particular interest because it was assumed that semantic knowledge is relatively preserved in normal aging. It appears that aging impacts on categorization—such as taxonomic categorization—and is further affected in individuals with dementia or other forms of cognitive impairment. In addition there are reciprocal effects between categorization abilities and executive function (e.g., inhibition of distraction, selective attention) that are evidenced in aging. Given the structural changes in the brain and the functional changes in the frontal lobes associated with aging, this chapter helps with highlighting the potential clinical applications and outcome measures for intervention.

The case for categorization in nonhuman species has been extensively investigated over the past few decades. In this new contribution, Castro and Wasserman review perceptual category learning and relational category learning in pigeons. The studies reveal that pigeons are able to form both perceptual and abstract categories with considerable proficiency, demonstrating that categorization and abstract processes are also the province of animal cognition.

Koriat and Sorka offer a review of the foundations of the classical view of categorization and their challenges, leading to a proposal of their model: category membership judgments are constructed on the fly. The self-consistency model of subjective confidence posits that the cues underlying judgments of category membership are of numerous and different kinds and that subjects rely on whatever cues come to mind when a decision has to be made. The authors present empirical evidence in favor of their model and suggest that it best explains the different responses made by the same person and by different people on the same item.

Shen and Gil examine the case of visual hybrids (e.g., mermaids, centaurs) that constitute examples of categorical ambiguity, asking whether one of the hybrid's parents is more central to its conceptualization. Their main focus is evaluating the effect of the Ontological Hierarchy (humans > animals > plants > inanimates) on the conceptualization of hybrids.

In addition to these new chapters, most authors in the second edition of the Handbook have made moderate to extensive revisions to their original papers, thus reflecting the advances in the theories and methods in categories and in the process of categorization. The organization of all of these contributions has also been updated in an attempt to group them in a coherent fashion. The new sections in the Handbook are now Categorization in Cognitive Science, Neuroscience of Categorization and Category Learning, Semantic Categories, Syntactic Categories, Development of Categories, Grounding and Categories in Perception and Inference, Machine Category Learning and Data Mining, and The Naturalization of Categories.

Defining Youth

Youth is a unique social categorization defined by a time frame that is pertinent in every individual's life, a transitional phase between childhood and adulthood. It cuts across all other social intersections that are defined in terms of gender, class, race, ethnicity, caste, religion, or region. This identity is carried by everyone; however, its duration may be in question. Since it is positioned right before one's adulthood, experiences during this phase are critical in shaping the future, at individual and societal levels.

The international community has defined youth in terms of age brackets, although different organizations, institutions, and forums mark them differently. For instance, the African Youth Charter identifies youth as between 15 and 35 years; the European Youth in Action Programme specifies between 15 and 28 years with a possibility to include those as young as 13 years old; and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation identifies the youth bracket as 20–35 years. These varying age definitions reflect the diverse contexts they represent and highlight the fluidity in the age brackets owing to the experiences of waithood. The experiences of conflicts and violence explain the significant differences at the end of the brackets. Further, while the United Nations (UN) defines youth as those between the age of 15 and 24, the UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security redefined it as 18–29 years. The fact that the Resolution talks specifically of the young people in conflict settings has pushed the international community itself to reconsider who constitutes youth. In such settings, violence creates uncertainties that affect the everyday lives of the young people, such as hampered regular education cycles due to delayed schoolings; prolonged periods of unemployment and disrupted social interactions with peers; among others. This obstructs the regular timelines in an individual's life and, thus, questions these neatly defined age brackets.

This simplification of the process of defining youth in terms of age by the international community can be contested on grounds that youth is a much more complex identity, as the experiences they undergo are not necessarily found by these fixed brackets, particularly in conflict settings. Dwyer (2015) explains that youth as a social category challenge the notion of homogenous fixed cultures that urge to recognize “how the experiences of both war and peace take place at the intersection of social differences, including generations, gender, class, caste, race region, religion, and power.” Drawing from Dwyer's writings contextualized in Bali, the idea of youth is locally constructed and understood culturally that carry connotations which may not always be in sync with the Western idea (Dwyer, 2015). In Bali, which may also expand to other South East Asian countries and to the South Asian region to some extent, youth is locally interpreted in relation to one's marital status. Individuals in their youth are those who are unmarried and have not yet given themselves to livelihood and reproductive activities (Dwyer, 2015).

Durhan defines youth as, “A historically constructed social category, a relational concept, and a group of actors. It provides avenues to reveal the ephemeral nature of young people as well as their multiple identities” (Wamucii, 2012). Further, an attempt to define youth which is more relevant in their local contexts raises various critical questions. Building on Dwyer (2015) arguments, some of these include: What are the literal translations for the word youth in the local dialects? What does it mean to be a youth for the young people? How are categories of youth locally framed? What are some of the characteristics that are associated with youth? Who are included in and excluded from these particular framings? Do the older generations understand youth as youth see themselves? Are these categories rigid or do they allow for some flexibility? How experiences of protracted violence further shape youth identity? In what ways conflicts affect youth differentially?

A group is a bounded collection of interacting individuals or a consensual social categorization. Sociological studies of groups (in contrast to psychological studies) always include attention to collective phenomena (such as norms, cohesion, and relational structures pertaining to friendship, control, power, status, communication, trust). The most successful studies of groups (which began in the 1930s) involve attention to functional, cognitive, and structural interdependencies at the same time. There are field studies (mainly concerned with conformity, status, group divisions, identities, and their combination in impression management) and experimental studies. Of the latter the most noteworthy are the expectation states theories and various branches of theories of exchange in networks. More recently, promising studies on group-related friendship networks and of cognitive networks have emerged. Although the field is lively and productive, a critical review of the field prominently includes the following points where improvement is desirable: (a) too few connections between field and experimental studies; (b) too little attention to the primacy of functional (i.e., goal related) interdependencies; (c) too little attention to ‘groupishness’ (i.e., to categorization and framing effects); and (d) no attention to the distinction between small networks and groups.

3.1 Categorization

Categorization leads to accentuation of differences among objects in different categories, and accentuation of similarities of objects within categories. When social categorizations are salient, accentuation results in stereotypical perceptions of both categories. When people categorize one another they generally include the self in one of the categories. Attributes that are stereotypical for the in-group may then be ascribed to self, a process labeled self-stereotyping. As a result of self-stereotyping the self is ‘depersonalized.’ This means that the self and other in-group members are seen as interchangeable in their relationship to out-group members.

Principle 3: Gerontologist Must Work to Actively Reduce Ageism

Ageism, pervasive discrimination against older adults, is widespread in the United States (Palmore, 1990). Allport used his social categorization theory to describe the basic tenants of discrimination (Allport, 1954). The non-dominant group (older adults in this case) is viewed as homogeneous and portrayed as having a variety of negative characteristics. Older adults are viewed stereotypically as: (1) alike; (2) alone and lonely; (3) sick, frail, and dependent; (4) depressed; (5) rigid; and (6) unable to cope (Hinrichsen, 2006). This pervasive view portrays all older adults in a negative light, ignoring the incredible hetereogeneity of aging and the strengths and positive attributes of older adults. Clinical gerontologists, themselves, must be cognizant of their own ageist thoughts and beliefs, and try to minimize these.

Ageism can often be found where age and disability or decline intersect. This can be reflected in interactions whereby gerontologists might direct their comments only to a family caregiver, for example, and ignore the person with dementia who is sitting in the same room. Acting as an expert witness in a conservatorship case, I reviewed the neuropsychological report of a 94-year-old gentleman. The man in question had no cognitive deficits, and performed in the superior range on all cognitive tests. Despite this, the original evaluator, a neuropsychologist with excellent credentials concluded that “all older adults should have a conservator” since on average older people are more susceptible to financial fraud.

Ageism and overly paternalistic conclusions are, in my experience, often found in cases such as the above. In these cases, broad generalizations are applied to individual cases without a close examination of the unique circumstances of the case. General population findings of risk factors and predictive abilities are given too much weight when being applied to an individual. The fact that older adults are more susceptible to financial fraud does not support the notion of the loss of financial freedom for each older individual. Even with good normative (generalized information) data it is paramount for clinical gerontologists to focus on the unique individual being assessed. An individual's assessment must focus on the unique strengths noted in the person, environment or support system, and not simply on whether the assessment supports a diagnosis of a geriatric syndrome. When can a person with dementia make a valid will? What decisions about care can a person with dementia make? These types of questions can only be adequately addressed when details of individual cases are examined objectively and systematically.

8.3 Different interventions are required to fight different prejudices

Prejudice is not a monolithic phenomenon. Yes, human beings are implicit organizers; we like to lump people into categories. And, yes, social categorization has some psychological implications that generalize across virtually all kinds of social categories. But neither of these facts implies that social categories are conceptually interchangeable. Specific kinds of social categories (e.g., the categorical distinctions between male and female, between coalitional ingroup and outgroup, between people who look subjectively normal and those who do not) were associated with specific kinds of adaptive problems in ancestral environments and, as a consequence, elicit specific kinds of prejudices in the here and now. These different prejudices are triggered by different perceptual cues and are defined by different emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Their activation and expressions are moderated by different sets of variables. This functional specificity of prejudices necessarily limits the realistic range of impact that any single prejudice-reduction intervention strategy is likely to have.

To effectively combat any specific threat-based prejudice, an intervention must target a specific form of threat, the specific cues that connote it, and the specific dispositional and situational factors that inhibit or enhance it. But we cannot expect that intervention to effectively inhibit other, functionally independent prejudices. An intervention designed to overcome sexism cannot be expected to have much impact on ageism. An intervention that mitigates fearful reactions to someone who looks like one of “them” (rather than one of “us”) may be entirely ineffective in reducing aversion to someone else's facial disfigurement or reducing resentment toward someone else's status as a welfare recipient. To combat those other prejudices, additional, functionally focused interventions are required.

And when a target group is characterized by features that connote multiple kinds of threat, no single intervention strategy—no matter how thoughtfully designed—is likely to be completely effective. Immigrants are a good example. Many immigrant groups are perceived to be coalitional outgroups and also are characterized by appearances and behaviors that deviate from local normative standards. These immigrants may therefore be implicitly associated with the threat of interpersonal harm as well as the threat of disease (and possibly other threats as well), and so be the simultaneous targets of multiple kinds of prejudice. A single, highly focused intervention strategy may curb one of those prejudices, but leave the others untouched. To effectively reduce behavioral discrimination against this single target group, a multipronged set of interventions—each of which must be carefully calibrated to a specific threat-based prejudice—may be necessary.

A realistic psychological approach to prejudice reduction may need to operate on a principle that guides the medical approach to disease reduction. There is no panacea that reduces an individual's susceptibility to all possible forms of infectious disease. There is not even a single vaccination that inoculates against all strains of influenza. Because different infectious diseases have distinct pathogenic causes, different vaccinations are required to inoculate against them. The same is true of prejudice. Because different prejudices have distinct evolutionary roots as well as distinct psychological causes, different interventions are required to fight them.