Abstract This article develops a formal model of interest groups and congressional control of the bureaucracy. It shows that, even when interest groups act strategically, lobbyists can facilitate Congress's oversight role. Our results indicate that lobbying can help reduce informational asymmetries between Congress and the bureaucracy, and that the mere threat of sounding a "fire alarm" can result in policy concessions for interest groups. We demonstrate that agencies often moderate their proposals to obtain interest-group support, that interest groups will be truthful in their endorsements even with no explicit penalty for lying, and that lobbying can reduce the uncertainty surrounding policy outcomes. Moreover, when multiple interest groups lobby Congress, legislators make oversight decisions based on the range of moderate groups that support the agency's actions. Thus they can control administrative agencies by observing the dividing line between interest groups that support the agency's proposal and those that oppose it. Show Journal Information The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is an interdisciplinary exercise. It seeks to promote an understanding of many complex phenomena by examining such matters from a combined law, economics, and organization perspective (or a two-way combination thereof). In this connection, we use the term organization broadly - to include scholarship drawing on political science, psychology and sociology, among other fields. It also holds the study of institutions - especially economic, legal, and political institutions - to be specifically important and greatly in need of careful analytic study. Publisher Information Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Abstract Existing theories of legislative delegation to bureaucracies typically focus on a single legislature, often the U.S. Congress. We argue that this parochial focus has important limitations. If one contends that politicians respond rationally to their political environment when adopting strategies for controlling bureaucrats, then theories of control should be able to explain how differences in the political environment-and in particular in the democratic institutional arrangements that shape this environment-influence strategies for controlling bureaucrats. We offer such a theory about the conditions under which legislatures should rely on statutory control (i.e., detailed legislation) in order to limit the discretion of agencies. The theory focuses on the interactions of four factors: conflict between legislators and bureaucrats, the bargaining costs associated with choosing the institutions for controlling bureaucrats, the professional capacity of legislators to create institutions for control, and the impact of political institutions on the relative costs and benefits of statutory and nonstatutory strategies of control. We test our argument using legislation from 1995 and 1996 that affects Medicaid programs. The results show that legislatures are more likely to make use of statutory controls when control of government is divided between the two parties, the two chambers of the legislature are unified in their opposition to the executive, the legislature is more professionalized, and the legislature does not have easily available options for nonstatutory control. Journal Information The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS), published four times each year, is one of the most widely-read political science journals in the United States. AJPS is a general journal of political science open to all members of the profession and to all areas of the discipline of political science. JSTOR provides a digital archive of the print version of American Journal of Political Science. The electronic version of American Journal of Political Science is available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=showIssues&code;=ajps. Authorized users may be able to access the full text articles at this site. Publisher Information The Midwest Political Science Association, founded in 1939, is a national organization of more than 2,800 political science professors, researchers, students, and public administrators from throughout the United States and over 50 foreign countries. The association is dedicated to the advancement of scholarly communication in all areas of political science. Each year the association sponsors a three-day conference of political scientists in Chicago for the purpose of presenting and discussing the latest research in political science. More than 2,000 individuals participate in this conference, which features 300 panels and programs on politics. The MPSA is headquartered at Indiana University. For further information, contact William D. Morgan, Executive Director, email: . Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR
Collection. Which agency is known as the watchdogs of bureaucracy?The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is known as "the investigative arm of Congress" and "the congressional watchdog." GAO supports the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and helps improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.
How does the Congress control check the bureaucracy?Congress uses public hearings to monitor bureaucratic behavior. Under some circumstances, Congress can also control the bureaucracy by re-writing legislation and altering appropriations to provide greater direction to those who must implement its policies.
Who keeps check on the bureaucracy?Most directly, the president controls the bureaucracies by appointing the heads of the fifteen cabinet departments and of many independent executive agencies, such as the CIA, the EPA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These cabinet and agency appointments go through the Senate for confirmation.
Does Congress fund the bureaucracy?Congress creates bureaucratic agencies and departments and enables them, especially through funding, to implement laws on a daily basis. It also exercises oversight to make sure that the bureaucracy is doing its job properly and efficiently.
How are bureaucracies controlled?Congressional bureaucratic influence results from legislative and investigative oversight functions, personnel selection and staffing, and the budget. The public, especially professional associations and individual policy experts, exercises a great deal of influence over the Federal bureaucracy.
What is Congress's most powerful oversight tool?Perhaps Congress's most powerful oversight tool is the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 28 The GAO is an agency that provides Congress, its committees, and the heads of the executive agencies with auditing, evaluation, and investigative services.
|
Congress own watchdog organization that checks on how the bureaucracies are spending their money
zusammenhängende Posts
Urheberrechte © © 2024 toptenid.com Inc.
